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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
operates private passenger and freight lines, two hotels, a dairy,
and a commissary."5 In fact, it may be asserted as a general
proposition that the Supreme Court has never declared a state
tax upon a federal instrumentality valid because such instrumen-
tality was not exercising a usual or ordinary governmental func-
tion. 8
The complicated body of the law of the immunity of national
banks from state taxation is not within the scope of this inquiry.
However, it is interesting to note that in State v. Whitney Na-
tional Bank of New Orleans17 the Louisiana Supreme Court sus-
tained a license tax on office buildings operated by a national
bank, with respect to such parts of the buildings not used in
banking but were rented to third parties, and that in Parker v.
Mississippi Tax Commission8 a state income tax upon an officer
of the Federal Land Bank was upheld.
The principal case stresses the fact that in order for immu-
nity to accrue it is necessary that the taxed function be indispen-
sable to the maintenance of the government, and that the burden
be not speculative, but direct and ascertainable. The burden fall-
ing on either government from taxation of the income of the
employees of its corporations by the other government will be
found in almost every instance to be speculative. Moreover, not
many of such corporations can be found to be indispensable to
the maintenance of government. It seems, therefore, that the
tests of the Gerhardt case should certainly apply reciprocally, and
that state attempts to tax the employees of the federal corpora-
tions which have entered fields traditionally private should be
upheld.
J.D.M.
DAMAGES-PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES NOT RECOVER-
ABLF,-The plaintiff sent draperies to the defendant laundries to
be cleaned. Certain of the articles were returned so damaged as
to be unfit for further service. They had been in use by the
plaintiff for seven years and during that time their value had
15. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 57 S.Ct. 269, 81 L.Ed.
306 (1937).
16. See Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323.
17. 189 La. 211, 179 So. 84 (1938).
18. 178 Miss. 680, 174 So. 567 (1937).
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diminished considerably. Despite this fact, plaintiff asked for a
sum equivalent to the replacement cost of the goods. Held, re-
placement cost must be denied as constituting a claim for the
allowance of punitive damages contrary to the rule in Louisiana.
Gugert v. New Orleans Independent Laundries, Inc., 181 So. 653
(La. App. 1938).
The French law does not allow punitive damages; recovery is
limited to the exact loss sustained.1 This limitation is based upon
Articles 1382 and 1149-1151 of the French Civil Code which corre-
spond to Articles 2315 and 1934 respectively of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870. Nevertheless, the practice of allowing punitive
damages was established at an early period in Louisiana, and
this practice seems to have had its beginning in a case where the
court allowed recovery for slander in the absence of a showing of
special damages.2 Subsequently the theory of this case was fol-
lowed in an award of "smart money" or punitive damages for the
illegal detention of a horse, the court feeling that punishment for
the unlawful act was necessary. Thereafter, the court stated that
punishment of the guilty party may be used as a justification for
an award of damages where the court desires to prevent the repe-
tition of a tortious act.' Likewise the court has allowed exem-
plary damages for the malicious and illegal seizure of property 5
and also for injury resulting from gross carelessness or reckless
indifference to the rights of others.6 The preceding cases indicate
that the doctrine of punitive damages was based upon the theory
that the wrongdoer should be punished as a consequence of his
malice, bad faith, or gross carelessness, in the absence of which it
has frequently been held that recovery should be limited to the
actual damages sustained.7 That the punishment of the wrong-
doer for his malice or bad faith is the basis of the recovery is like-
wise exemplified by the cases in which recovery has been refused
1. 6 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1930) 922,
no 681; 7 id. 159, no 855.
2. Carlin v. Stewart, 2 La. 73 (1830).
,3. Summers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 161 (1836).
4. See Black v. The Carrollton Railroad Co., 10 La. Ann. 83, 40, (1855).
5. Tiblier v. Alford, 12 Fed. 262 (C. C. E. D. La. 1882).
6. Eptstein v. Roux, 12 Orl. App. 313 (1915).
7. Stetson v. LeBlanc, 6 La. 266 (1834); Stinson v. Bulsson, 17 La. 567
(1841); Biggs v. D'Aquin, 13 La. Ann. 21 (1858); Boulard v. Calhoun, 13 La.
Ann. 445 (1858); Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. Ann. 806 (1859); Carter v. Tufts,
15 La. Ann. 16 (1860); Perrine v. Planchard, 15 La. Ann. 133 (1860); Massie
v. Baily & Co., 33 La. Ann. 485 (1881); Kee v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 518 (1883);
Marin v. Scatterfield, 41 La. Ann. 742, 6 So. 501 (1.889); Tqwpisend v, Fontenot,
42 La. Ann. 890, 8 So. 616 (1890),
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when the action was against the wrongdoer's estate, suit not hav-
ing been brought before his death.8
In 1917 the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected the early
rule and held that, under the provisions of the Civil Code, recov-
ery must be limited to the extent of the loss suffered.9 In arriving
at this decision the court relied on Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, which provides that a person through whose
fault damage is caused shall "repair" it, and Article 1934 (par. 2)
which limits recovery, even where fraud and bad faith are pres-
ent, to damages which are foreseeable. The principle of this case
has been consistently followed and is now a thoroughly ingrained
principle of our law.10 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether
the doctrine of punitive damages has entirely disappeared from
our jurisprudence.1 In those cases where punitive damages had
been allowed in the past, it often became customary to consider
the financial ability of the defendant in determining the measure
of damages to be awarded.12 Apparently, the basis of this consid-
eration was that the same monetary judgment would not operate
with equal effect upon rich and poor alike. The principle of con-
sidering the defendant's ability to pay has been reaffirmed once
by the Supreme Court' and twice by the Court of Appeals" after
the allowance of punitive damages had been discontinued. This
consideration of the financial ability of the defendant appears to
be inconsistent with the present rule which limits recovery to
damages actually sustained. Although this consideration may be
a judicial expression of the theory that social costs should be
borne in proportion to the wrongdoer's ability to pay, and may
not be a holdover of the practice of awarding punitive damages,
yet such a theory can hardly be justified under the provisions of
8. Edwards v. Ricks, 30 La. Ann. 926 (1878); Johnson v. Levy, 122 La. 118,
47 So. 422 (1908).
9. Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So.
541 (1917).
10. Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 74 So. 998 (1917); Mente
& Co. v. Kaplan, 146 La. 678, 83 So. 895 (1920); Douglas, Burt & Buchanan
Co. v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 150 La. 1038, 91 So. 503 (1922); Trenchard v.
Central Laundry Co., 154 La. 1003, 98 So. 558 (1923); Spearman v. Toye Bros.
Auto & Taxicab Co., 164 La. 677, 114 So. 591 (1927); McCoy v. Arkansas Nat-
ural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932).
11. This phase of Louisiana jurisprudence has thrice merited comment:
Marr, The Punitive Damages Heresy (1917) 2 So. L. Q. 1; Janvier,' Punitive
Damages in Louisiana (1929) 10 Loyola L. J. 26; McMahon, Damages Based
Upon What the Traffic Will Bear (1930) 11 Loyola L. J. 115.
12. Loyacano v. Jurgens, 50 La. Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898); Daly v. Kiel,
106 La. 170, 30 So. 254 (1901).
13. Jackson v. Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722 (1924).
14. Gallman v. Young, 6 La. App. 137 (1927); Perez-Sandi v. Berges, 12
La. App. 191, 125 So. 185 (1929).
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the: Civil Code and is open to the further objection that, unless
the financial status of the plaintiff be also considered, the desired
end may not result. It is submitted that this apparent inconsist-
ency between the doctrine disallowing exemplary damages and
the rule allowing recovery based upon the financial ability of the
wrongdoer may well be resolved by an abandonment of the latter
doctrine. J.B.D.
PRACTICE OF LAW-USE OF STANDARD LEGAL FORM BY REAL Es-
TATE BROKER PROHIBITED--A real estate broker selected from a
published legal form book and filled out a contract blank for two
customers to be used in the completion of a real estate transac-
tion. Held, that this constitutes the practice of law and such
person must be duly licensed. In re Gore, 58 Ohio App. 79, 115
N.E. (2d) 968 (1937).
There is general agreement that the practice of law embraces
a wider field than the preparation of pleadings and court proce-
dure. It also includes the drawing of various legal instruments
and the giving of advice upon legal matters.1 Borderline cases
usually involve the preparation or selection of instruments of a
legal character, and in solving such problems some courts seek to
determine whether the practice in question is a major portion of
the business engaged in or is only a necessary incident thereof.
Under this rule it has been held that the preparation of a bill of
sale for customers was incidental to the business, notwithstanding
that a fee was charged for the service.2 Other cases seem to lay
more emphasis on whether or not the alleged offender holds
himself out as doing legal work-thus a trust company has been
held to be engaged illegally in the practice of law where it adver-
tised that it specialized in drawing contracts, deeds and mort-
gages.8 Again, whether or not the defendant is making profit on
the "law business" has also been used as a test.4 In whatever
words the test may be stated the cases generally seem to recog-
1. National Savings Bank of the District of Columbia v. William H.
Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199, 25 L.Ed. 621, 623 (1880); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
2. People v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666
(1919); reargument denied, 228 N.Y. 585, 127 N.E. 919 (1920).
3. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157
(1930), and cases therein cited.
4. State v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 355 Mo. 845, 74 S.W. (2d) 348 (1934)
("valuable consideration" test-promise for promise was sufficient).
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